It has been shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) may be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, raising the concern on their robustness particularly for safety-critical applications. Recognizing the local nature and limitations of existing adversarial attacks, we present a new type of global adversarial attacks for assessing global DNN robustness. More specifically, we propose a novel concept of global adversarial example pairs in which each pair of two examples are close to each other but have different class labels predicted by the DNN. We further propose two families of global attack methods and show that our methods are able to generate diverse and intriguing adversarial example pairs at locations far from the training or testing data. Moreover, we demonstrate that DNNs hardened using the strong projected gradient descent (PGD) based (local) adversarial training are vulnerable to the proposed global adversarial example pairs, suggesting that global robustness must be considered while training robust deep learning networks.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been applied to many applications including safety-critical tasks such as autonomous driving [1] and unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) [2] , which demand high robustness of decision making. However, recently it has been shown that DNNs are susceptible to attacks by adversarial examples [3] . For image classification, for example, adversarial examples may be generated by adding crafted perturbations indistinguishable to human eyes to legitimate inputs to alter the decision of a trained DNN into an incorrect one. Several studies attempt to reason about the underlying causes of susceptibility of deep neural networks towards adversarial examples, for instance, ascribing vulnerability to linearity of the model [3] or flatness/curvedness of the decision boundaries [4] . A widely agreed consensus is certainly desirable, which is under ongoing research.
Target global adversarial attack problem. The main objectives of this work are to reveal potential vulnerability of DNNs by presenting a new type of attacks, namely global adversarial attacks, propose methods for generating such global attacks, and finally demonstrate that DNNs enhanced by conventional (local) adversarial training exhibit little defense to the proposed global adversarial examples. While several adversarial attack methods were proposed [3, [5] [6] [7] [8] in recent literature, we refer to these methods as local adversarial attack methods as they all aim to solve the local adversarial attack problem defined as follows. Definition 1. Local adversarial attack problem. Given an input space Ω, one legitimate input example x ∈ Ω with label y ∈ Y, and a trained DNN f : Ω → Y, find another (adversarial) input example x ∈ Ω within a radius of around x under a distance measure defined by a norm function · : {x a − x b |x a ∈ Ω, x b ∈ Ω } → R ≥0 such that f (x ) = y, x − x ≤ .
Typically, the above problem is solved via optimization governed by a loss function, L : Y × Y → R, measuring the difference between the predicted label f (x ) and y:
Importantly, the above problem formulation has two key limitations.
(1) it is deemed local in the sense that it only examines model robustness inside a local region centered at each given input x, which in practice is chosen from the training or testing dataset. As such, local adversarial attacks are not adequate since evaluating the DNN robustness around the training and testing data does not provide a complete picture of robustness globally, i.e. in the entire space Ω. On the other hand, assessment of global robustness is essential, e.g. for safety-critical applications. (2) local attack methods assume that for each clean example x the label y is known. As a result, they are inapplicable to attack the DNN around locations where no labeled data are available.
In this paper, we propose a notion of global DNN robustness and a global adversarial attack problem formulation to assess it. We evaluate global robustness of a given DNN by assessing the potential high sensitivity of its decision function with respect to small input perturbation leading to change in the predicted label, globally in the entire Ω. By solving the global attack problem, we generate multiple global adversarial example pairs such that each pair of two examples are close to each other but have different labels predicted by the DNN. The detailed definitions are presented in Section 2.
Related works. Apart from the local adversarial attacks, several other approaches for DNN robustness evaluation have been reported. The Lipschitz constant is utilized to bound DNNs' vulnerability to adversarial attacks [9, 10] . As argued in [11, 12] , however, currently there is no accurate method for estimating the Lipschitz constant, and the resulting overestimation can easily render its use unpractical. [13, 14] propose to train a generative model for generating unseen samples for which misclassification happens. However, the ground-truth labels of generated examples must be provided for final assessment and these examples do not capture model's vulnerability due to high sensitivity to small input perturbation.
Our contributions. We propose a new concept of global adversarial examples and several global attack methods. Specifically, we (a) propose a novel concept called global adversarial example pairs and formulate a global adversarial attack problem for assessing the model robustness over the entire input space without extra data labeling; (b) present two families of global adversarial attack methods:
(1) alternating gradient adversarial attacks and (2) extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling attack, and demonstrate their effectiveness in generating global adversarial example pairs; (c) using the proposed global attack methods, demonstrate that DNNs hardened using strong projected gradient descent (PGD) based (local) adversarial training are vulnerable towards the proposed global adversarial example pairs, suggesting that global robustness must be considered while training DNNs.
Global adversarial attacks
We formulate a new global adversarial attack problem as follows. Definition 2. Global adversarial attack problem. Given an input space Ω and an DNN model f : Ω → Y, find one or more global adversarial example pairs (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ Ω × Ω within a radius of under a distance measure defined by a norm function · :
When no confusion occurs, global adversarial example pair and global adversarial examples are used interchangeably throughout this paper. The above problem formulation can be cast into an optimization problem w.r.t. a certain loss function L : Y × Y → R in the following form:
For convenience of notation, we use It is important to note that our problem formulation doesn't restrict adversarial examples to be around a certain input example as in the case of the existing local adversarial attacks; it only sets an indistinguishable distance between a pair of two input examples in order to examine the entire input space, e.g. at locations far away from the training or testing dataset. Fig. 1 contrasts the conventional local adversarial examples with the proposed global adversarial examples. Importantly, our global attack formulation does not require additional labeled data; it directly measures the model's sensitivity to input perturbation and be applied globally in the entirety of the input space.
We propose two families of attack methods to solve (2) as a way of generating global adversarial examples: 1) alternating gradient global adversarial attacks and 2) extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling global adversarial attack, as discussed in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively.
3 Alternating gradient global adversarial attacks
Alternating attack illustration.
For global adversarial example pair generation per (2), a pair of two examples (x 1 , x 2 ) shall be be optimized to maximize the loss L f (x 1 , x 2 ) under a distance constraint. We propose a family of attack methods called alternating gradient global adversarial attacks which proceed as follows: 1) start from an initial input pair; 2) fix the first example, and then attack (move) the second under the distance constraint while maximizing the loss L f (x 1 , x 2 ) using a gradient-based local adversarial attack method, referred to as a sub-attack method here, 3) swap the roles of the first and (updated) second examples, i.e. fix the second example while attacking the first, 4) repeat this process for a number of iterations, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Given a DNN model f and a loss function L, a sub-attack method can be characterized using a function x = f s_attk (x, y, R x, ; f, L) constructing an adversarial example x w.r.t example x and its corresponding label y, where R x, = {x + δ| δ ≤ } specifies the region for adversarial sample generation.
Suppose we start with an initial example pair
, then we get the (i + 1)-round example pair from the (i)-round sample pair by:
Here, to attack one example, we use the other example's model prediction as the label when applying the sub-attack method f s_attk so that the difference between two examples' model predictions is maximized. In the meanwhile, the search region for attacking one example is constrained (centered)
by the other example. Hence, the distance between the two examples is always less than . Equations 3 and 4 are invoked to alternately attack x
2 to generate an updated example pair for the next round. As the global attack continues, multiple global adversarial sample pairs may be generated along the way.
Algorithm 1 Global PGD attack algorithm for classification.
Input:
Initial starting example pair
; Example vector dimension D; distance constraint ; Number of total rounds N ; Number of sub-attack steps S;
Step size a for the sub-attack. Output: The set of generated global adversarial sample pairs T ;
:
for j ← 1 to S do 6:
end for 8:
10:
for j ← 1 to S do 11:
12:
end for 13:
14: end for
Choice of sub-attack methods. We leverage the popular gradient-based local adversarial attack methods as sub-attack methods under the above family of global attacks. Particularly, the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [3] , iterative FGSM (IFGSM) [7] , and projected gradient descent (PGD) [8] may be considered for sub-attack method f s_attk . As one example, we present the algorithm flow for the global PGD (G-PGD) attack targeting classifiers with PGD employed as the sub-attack in Algorithm 1, where the Clip (x, mathcalR) function drags the input x outside the preset region R onto the boundary of R. The global IFGSM (G-IFGSM) skips the random noise perturbations (steps 3 and 8). The global FGSM (G-FGSM) sets the number of sub-attack steps S to be 1 and the step size for sub-attack a to be in addition to ignoring the random noise perturbation steps.
Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling attack
While the family of alternating gradient global adversarial attacks discussed in Section 3 can work effectively in practice, such methods may get trapped at a local maximum, degrading the quality of global attack. To this end, we propose a stochastic optimization approach based on the extreme value distribution theory and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, which is more advantageous from a global optimization point of view.
Extreme value distribution. Consider sampling a set of i.i.d input example pairs
can be regarded as a random variable following a certain distribution characterized by its density function p L * (l). The Fisher-Tippett-Gnedenko theorem says that the distribution of the maximum value of examples, if exists, can only be one of the three families of extreme value distribution: the Gumbel class, the Fréchet and the reverse Weibull class [15] . Hence, p L * (l) falls into one of the three families as well, whose cumulative density function (CDF) F L * (l) can be written in a unified form, called the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution:
where µ, σ and ξ are the location, scale, and shape parameter for the GEV distribution and may be obtained through the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
Assuming that the desired generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution of the loss function is available, multiple large loss values, corresponding to potential global adversarial example pairs, may be generated by sampling the GEV distribution. The added benefit here is that the inherent randomness in this sampling process may be explored to find more globally optimal solutions. Nevertheless, since the GEV distribution may not be easily sampled directly, We adopt the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to sample the GEV distribution [16] . In reality, the GEV distribution is not known a priori and shall be estimated using MLE based on a sample of data as described below.
Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling algorithm (GEVMCMC). The proposed GEVMCMC algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2 for the case of classification problems. There exist two essential components for MCMC sampling: the target distribution, which is in this case the desired GEV distribution, and the proposal distribution, which is a surrogate distribution easy to sample. For each MCMC round, we collect an example from the proposal distribution, and then accept this example or discard it while keeping the previous one based on an acceptance ratio p A in Step 6 of Algorithm 2 [16] . In order to sample the block maximum for the extreme value distribution, a block of example pairs are collected from the proposal distribution in each round as in Step 3 of the algorithm instead of a single example. As the MCMC sampling process proceeds, the actual sampling distribution implemented converges to the target (GEV) distribution.
Algorithm 2 Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling algorithm (GEVMCMC) for global attack. 
from the proposal distribution
Update the GEV distribution p L * (l) using top k loss values in the history. 6 :
Sample a uniform random variable α ∼ U [0, 1]
Accept the new example.
10:
Reject and keep the previous example.
end if 13:
14: end for Importantly, the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution p L * (l) of the loss function doesn't exist at the beginning of the algorithm. Therefore, it is estimated during the sampling process. Two techniques are considered to obtain an accurate GEV distribution. A warm-up procedure (Step 1 in Algorithm 2) using a few rounds of G-PGD is performed first to collect a few global adversarial example pairs of large loss values. In each round, the top k loss values among all example pairs in the history including the ones in the current block are selected to estimate p L * (l) based on MLE in Step 5 of Algorithm 2.
Proposal distribution design. The convergence speed of MCMC sampling towards the target distribution critically depends on the proposal distribution [16] . To efficiently generate high-quality global adversarial example pairs, we consider the following essential aspects in designing the proposal distribution: (1) finding large loss values; (2) enabling global search; (3) constraining two examples in each pair to be within distance .
p c
We decompose the sampling of an example pair into two sequential steps: sample the center location x c and sample the difference vector ∆ between the two examples. Then, we construct the example pair by Fig. 3 . The two sampling steps are independent of each other, and hence, the proposal distribution conditioning on the previous example pair (x p c , ∆ p ) is split into a product of a center proposal and difference proposal distribution:
As such, the distance constraint for the two examples is only taken into consideration in the design of q ∆ (∆|x p c , ∆ p ) and no distance constraint is necessary when sampling the center.
We speed up the convergence of MCMC by incorporating the (normalized) gradient information
into the proposal distribution design. We design the center proposal distribution to be a multi-variate Gaussian distribution centered at x p c with a covariance matrix biasing to sampling along the gradient direction g to increase the likelihood of finding large loss values while allowing sampling in other directions during the same time: The gradient sign information is incorporated into the difference proposal distribution considering the distance constraint . Particularly, for the l ∞ norm based distance measure, we propose a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p B > 0.5 for each element of the difference vector:
which ensures that the pair (x 1 , x 2 ) be within distance and each difference component is more likely to be set according to the corresponding gradient sign component.
Experimental results
Experimental settings. We investigate several local and global methods on two popular image classification datasets: MNIST [17] and CIFAR10 [18] . To evaluate DNN robustness globally in the input space, we create an additional class "meaningless" and append 6,000 and 5,000 random noisy images (one tenth of the original training dataset) under this "meaningless" class into the original MNIST and CIFAR10 training datasets, respectively, and refer to the expanded training datasets as the augmented training datasets. All trained DNNs perform classification across 11 classes.
For MNIST, we train a neural network with two convolutional and two fully-connected layers with an accuracy of 99.43% with 40 training epochs. For CIFAR10, a VGG16 [19] network is trained for 300 epochs, reaching 94.25% accuracy. Furthermore, we globally attack adversarially-trained models, which are trained using adversarial training based on local adversarial examples. In each epoch of adversarial training, the adversarial samples are generated by attacking the DNN model from the last epoch using a 30-step local white-box PGD attack, which is considered a strong first-order attack [8] . And then an updated model is trained using both the augmented training set and the generated adversarial images. Adversarial training process is performed for additional 40 epochs for the MNIST model and 30 epochs for the CIFAR10 model, respectively. The ratio of the weighting parameters between the losses of the examples in the augmented training set and adversarial examples are 1 : 1.
Adversarial attack parameter settings. The l ∞ norm based perturbation limit (the maximum allowed difference between two close images) is set to M N IST = 0.1 for MNIST and to CIF AR10 = 0.005 for CIFAR10. We add another 10,000 random images with the "meaningless" class label into the original testing dataset (10,000 samples) to create an augmented testing dataset. We experiment three common local adversarial attack methods: FGSM [3] , IFGSM [7] , and PGD [8] , referred to as L-FGSM, L-IFGSM and L-PGD in this paper. Both L-IFGSM and L-PGD perform a 30-step attack with a l ∞ step size of /10. All local attacks are performed on the augmented testing set. Generated global adversarial sample pairs. The proposed global adversarial attack methods can generate diverse global adversarial pairs which are rather different from typical local attacks, representing a new type of DNN vulnerability. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show a set of global adversarial example pairs generated by GEVMCMC for the two datasets. In each sub-figure, the two images on the top are the starting pair of two identical starting images. The two at the bottom are the final global adversarial pair generated after 100 rounds of optimization steps. "N" indicates that the class label predicated by the model is "meaningless".
Compared to standard local adversarial attacks, the proposed global adversarial pairs are much more diverse and intriguing. For instance, it is possible to start with two identical random meaningless image but end up with some other two random images that are very similar to each other but have different legitimate class labels predicted by the model such as ones in Fig. 4a and 4d . We can also start from two identical images of a legitimate predicted class, and end up with two images with predicated labels that are different from each other and are also different from the starting label, as shown in Fig. 4b, 4e, 4f , 5b and 5e. Clearly, the existing local attacks such as FGSM, IFGSM, and PGD are not able to generate such complex global adversarial scenarios, which reveal additional hidden vulnerabilities of the model. Importantly, the existing local adversarial attacks cannot explore the input space beyond the training or testing dataset due to the perturbation constraint. In contrast, the proposed global adversarial attacks are very appealing in the following way: they may find a path towards unseen input space and check the model robustness along the way. For instance, we may start from some random testing image (Fig. 5a ) or original testing image (Fig. 5c) , and end up with a completely different image pair which may be both recognized by the humans as a legitimate class, however, the model predicts different labels for them. For instance, the final pairs in the Fig. 5a and Fig. 5c may be recognized as "8" and "4", respectively, which are completely different from their starting label. Table 1-4 show the global adversarial attack results for the MNIST and CIFAR10 models without and with local adversarial training. If the model predictions G-FGSM  86  95  69  81  33  72  76  67  G-IFGSM  98  100  92  90  69  85  84  92  G-PGD  97  100  80  67  12  73  74 for the two examples in a generated global adversarial pair are different, we regard this pair as one successful global attack. In these tables, the attack rate is defined as the ratio between the successful number of attacks over the total number of trails which is 10,000. The Max loss and Avg. loss are the maximum loss and average loss found in the attack process.
Local vs. global adversarial attacks
Attacking the natural MNIST and CIFAR10 models using a local attack method can reach a reasonablly high attack rate. For instance, L-PGD has an attack rate of 29.59% in the case of the natural MNIST, which drops down to 3.88% for the case of the adversarially-trained MNIST model, showing that adversarial training using local adversarial examples does improve the defense to such local attacks. However, all global adversarial attack methods achieve almost 100.00% attack rate and produce much higher average loss values compared to the local attack methods, regardless whether local adversarial training is performed or not. It is evident that adversarial training based on local adversarial examples shows none or little defense to global attacks. This indicates the effectiveness of the proposed global attack methods, and equally importantly, suggests that global adversarial examples defined in this paper must be coped with when training robust DNN models.
Comparison of the proposed global adversarial attack methods Table 5 compares the two types of the proposed global attack methods when starting from the same 100 original test ("Test") or 100 random testing ("Rand") example pairs. Each entry shows the number of cases out of the total 100 cases where the final adversarial pair generated by GEVMCMC has a loss higher than the one generated by the other method. Most entries in the table are larger than 50, implying that GEVMCMC finds worse adversarial example pairs than other global adversarial attack methods. We further show the maximum loss value and average loss value of the adversarial example pairs in each round in Fig. 6 -9 . After the initial warm-up rounds using G-PGD, the loss found by GEVMCMC increases rapidly, and ends up with a much larger value compared to that of the other global adversarial attack methods, which tend to converge at a local maximum. The only case in which GEVMCMC does not 
Conclusion
We propose a new global adversarial example pair concept and formulate the corresponding global adversarial attack problem to assess the robustness of DNNs over the entire input space without human data labeling. We further propose two families of global adversarial attack methods: (1) alternating gradient global adversarial attacks and (2) extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling global attack (GEVMCMC), demonstrating that DNN models even trained with local adversarial training are vulnerable to this new type of global attacks. Our attack methods are able to generate diverse and intriguing global adversarial which are very different from typical local attacks and shall be taken into consideration when training a robust model. GEVMCMC demonstrates the overall best performance among all proposed global attack methods due to its probabilistic nature.
